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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment commenced by Plaintiffs
and Respondents (hereinafter plaintiffs) pursuant to Section 78-33-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, seeking a declaration of the constitutionality
of section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, insofar as it exempts the
legislature, its committees, members and employees from the requirement
that travel outside the State be pre-approved by the defendants and appellants
(hereinafter defendants or board), and further that the Constitution of
Utah precludes the executive from limiting, monitoring or otherwise interfering with legislative expenditures,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim came on for hearing upon an agreed
statement of facts on January 28, 1976. The court granted plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on March 10, 1976, and ordered the payment of
plaintiffs' travel expenses.

In so acting, the court denied defendants'

motion to dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmation of the judgment and order in their favor.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Statement of Facts set forth in defendants' Brief accurately
states the facts agreed upon by the parties and upon which the lower court
based its decision.
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A R G U M E N T

POINT I

INDULGENCE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGISLATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIRES THAT THE EXCEPTION
TO PRIOR APPROVAL OF OUT-OF-STATE TRAVEL SET
FORTH IN SECTION 63-2-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, BE DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL.
Article VII, Sec. 13, Constitution of Utah, provides:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary
of State and Attorney General shall constitute a Board
of State Prison Commissioners, which Board shall have
such supervision of all matters connected with the
State Prison as may be provided by law. They shall, also,
constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to examine
all claims against the State except salaries or compensation
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other duties
as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the
State, except for salaries and compensation of officers
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legislature
without having been considered and acted upon by the
said Board of Examiners." (Emphasis added.)
Through enactment of section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
the legislature in pursuance of the authority granted it by Article VII,
Sec. 13, Constitution of Utah, conferred an additional duty upon the board
of examiners and its administrative functionary, the department of finance.
Its duty under the subject section is to promulgate rules and regulations
for travel and travel expenses based upon per diem, mileage and reimbursement.

Subsection (3) directs that "No obligation shall be incurred for

travel outside the state without the advance approval of the board of
examiners through the director of finance..."; but it also specifies that
"... this section shall not apply to the legislature, its committees, or
any member or employee of same."
Former section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (declared unconstitutional by this court in Toronto v, Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 R2d 795 (1964),
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insofar as it purported to lodge final authority to approve mileage and
travel expenses in the governor and director of finance); likewise, exempted
the legislature from its strictures.

It provided, in pertinent part that

"...this provision shall not apply to the legislature, legislative
committees or members and employees of the legislative counsel."
The rejection of plaintiffs1 claims for reimbursement for actual
and necessary travel based upon their failure to obtain advance "...certification as to the availability of funds ..." and an advance determination of
"...necessity and desireability..." clearly contravenes the express language
of section 63-2-15 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953. While defendants
readily concede that plaintiffs' travel was accomplished in accordance
with the travel policy adopted by the legislative management committee
which presumably conforms with the budgetary limitations imposed upon
the committee by section 36-12-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953; and that
the board has traditionally and customarily apprbved and acquiesced in the
practice of approving legislative travel expenses in a perfunctory manner
absent prior approval; they deny any authority in the legislature to incur
indebtedness or make expenditures without defendants' approval.

Yet, in

this jurisdiction, as in others, it is settled that legislative enactments
are entitled to e^ery constitutional indulgence and should not be declared
otherwise unless an irreconcilable conflict stands between the enactment
and its constitutional counterpart.

Newcomb vs. Ogden City, 121 Utah 503,

243 P.2d 941 (1952); Salt Lake City vs. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106
(1959); Trade Commission vs. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446
P.2d 958 (1968).

No such conflict stands in this action.

Little doubt the

framers of Article VII, Sec. 13, envisioned the executive better able than
the legislature to determine the availability of funds and the propriety of
-3-

claims because of its responsibility to daily run the government, but
considerably more doubt exists about whether they ever intended the executive
to exercise control over legislative expenditures.,
Payment of claims against the state necessarily requires the expenditure
of public funds and the responsibility for the allocation or appropriation
of public funds rests solely with the legislature.

The drafters of our

Constitution recognized this final authority to control the "purse strings"
when they included the proviso in Sec. 13, that "...no claim against the
State... shall be passed upon by the legislature without having been
considered and acted upon..." by the board.

The provision was included to

make it clear that the legislature not the board has the final say about
the expenditure of public money.
POINT II
LONG ACQUIESCENCE IN A PRACTICE UNDER A STATUTE
IS A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE
STATUTE'S VALIDITY,
Until the action which precipitated this suit, the board has never
construed its power under Sec. 13, to include control over internal
legislative expenditures. (R-2).

On the contrary, it has without question

approved the payment of legislative travel expenses in reliance
upon the legislative exception contained in section 63-2-15, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. (R-2).

While past practice is not dispositive of the issue

of constitutionality, this court has held that where doubt or uncertainty
exists concerning the validity of a statute "...the experience and
actual operation in the area in question are factors which may properly
be considered in determining its validity."

(concurring opinion

Justice Crockett) State Board of Education vs. State Board of Higher

-4-

Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1193 (1973).

There, this court

upheld the constitutionality of the Board of Higher Education Act based
upon "...the long interpretation of Article X, Sections 2 and 8, by the
legislature, with the acquiescence of the people, as well as the State Board
of Education, and the administrators of the institutions of higher learning...".
The long standing policy of the board to routinely approve the outof-state travel vouchers of legislators without prior approval both under
the State Finance Act enacted in 1941, and under the present provisions of
section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1963, weigh in favor
of the validity of the exception in section 63-2-15.
POINT III
ARTICLE VII, SEC. 13, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, DOES NOT
CONTEMPLATE THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE FISCAL CONTROL
OVER LEGISLATIVE EXPENDITURES.
While this court has held that mandamus will lie to compel the
board to audit and approve claims submitted pursuant to legislative
enactment, Thoreson vs. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 57 Pac. 175
(1899); that the board is not required to approve payment of a claim which is
not properly grounded under the law, Marioneaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91
Pac. 355 (1907); that the board may not arbitrarily refuse to approve a
claim which is just, authorized by law, presented in due form, and about which
no factual dispute exists, State ex rel. Davis vs. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95
Pac. 1071 (1908); and that the framers of Sec. 13, Article VII, intended to
give broad and sweeping powers to the board to examine the advisability and
necessity of any disbursement or proposed obligation of the state, State ex.
rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908); Bateman vs. Board of
Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958), Toronto vs. Clyde, 15 Utah
-5-

2d 403, 393 P.2d

795 (1964); it has neyer passed directly upon whether

the power of the board to examine claims extends, if at all, to an examination of the propriety of internal legislative expenditures.
Article V, Sec. 1 of our fundamental law provides:
"The powers of government of the State of Utah shall be
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in cases herein expressly
permitted.'1
This court in Wood vs. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d

516 (1962),

affirmed the importance of safeguarding clear lines of demarcation and
function between the components of our tripartite system of government.
Observed the court at page 362 of the Utah report:
"It is also pertinent to observe that if one of the
executive officers constituting the Board could
circumvent legislative action by refusing to pay
out funds appropriated to pay such a claim, problems
would arise in determining how far actions of that
character could extend; and may well result in
perplexities relating to the balance of power between
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our
state government. These departments, though to a
degree interrelated and cooperating in the overall
functions of government, have separate powers which
should be safeguarded in order to preserve this
balance which has always been recognized to be one
of the advantages of our system. In case of doubt or
uncertainty on a problem such as here exists, we think
it wise and desirable to adopt an interpretation of the
law and to follow a policy which will fit harmoniously
into and sustain that balance rather than to choose
an alternative which would provide a foundation for
disrupting it.
There is another principle which bears upon the question
here under consideration. Our Legislature is directly
representative of the people of the sovereign state,
and thus has-inherently all of the powers of government
except as otherwise specified by the State Constitution.
By way of comparison, it is significantly different in
that respect from the federal government, which is a
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government of limited powers that can properly do
only those things within the scope of the povj/ers
expressly granted to it by the states through the
Federal Constitution; whereas, the State Legislature,
having the residuum of governmental power, does not
look to the State Constitution for the grant of its
powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the
limitations on its authority. Therefore, it can do any
act or perform any function of government not specifically
prohibited by the State Constitution. In order to justify
a conclusion that the power to approve and pay such
claims has been taken away from the Legislature and
placed exclusively within the control of the Board of
Examiners, it would have to clearly so appear, which is
not the case here."
Although this court has rejected the notion that the framers intended
Sec. 13 to be subject in its entirety to future legislation, Bateman,
supra, it has recognized that the fundamental power of government is based
to a considerable extent in the legislature.

Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah

2d 191, 291 P.2d 400 (1955); Bateman, supra.
The proviso in Sec. 13 that "...no claims shall be passed upon by
the legislature without having been considered ancj acted upon by the said
Board of Examiners..." lends further credence to the proposition that the
state constitutional fathers intended to ultimately rest the state's fiscal
policy with the legislature.
At issue in Budge, supra, was the meaning to be accorded the "legislative
passage on claims" proviso in Sec. 13 of Article VII. This court concluded
it meant that board action was not intended to be so final and absolute as
to preclude further legislative action.
"We can perceive no other meaning than that after
the Board has performed its duty of examining and acting
upon such claims, the Legislature may then 'pass upon'
i.e., exercise its judgment upon them and take such action
as it deems appropriate." (Utah report)
"To decide otherwise would produce the illogical result
of turning the subsequent presentation of claims...into an
empty gesture whose only purpose would be to rubber-stamp
the action of the Board." (Utah report)
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It is certain from Budge, supra, that the boardfs power to examine
claims against the state is subject to legislative review.

If it were

otherwise, the executive would be engaged in the business of deciding how
best to spend public funds—a function reserved exclusively by Article V
of the Constitution to the legislature.
While good reason no doubt abides the decision of the constitutional
fathers to vest the state's constitutional officers with the "power to examine
all claims against the state" in the first instance, to determine whether
such claims are really against the state or simply a request for a gift
called a "claim" or some other illegitimate petition for state funds, the
vestment was neyer intended to extend to prior approval of legislative
appropriations or to approval of internal legislative expenditures made
from funds appropriated by the legislature from the public treasury to itself.
As observed in Bateman, supra, one important function of the examiners
"...is to investigate and act as a fact finder and advisor to the legislature
on claims..." because it is better equipped than a part-time legislature to
assay the daily affairs of government.

However, its power to examine does

not extend to "salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law" albeit
that they are certainly claims against the state treasury.

The reason for

the exception contained in Article VII, Sec. 13, seems obvious.

The legislature

is vested with the exclusive power to appropriate public funds, including
fixing by law the salaries and the compensation of state officers.

Neither

the executive nor the judiciary is endowed under our Constitution with original
authority to question the wisdom or the amount of such appropriations.
It is presumed that the legislature will exercise good faith and fiscal
responsibility in its duties.

Its spending wisdom is not, nor

was it intended by Sec. 13 of Article VII to be, subject to executive surveillanc
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The people, not the executive, sit in judgment of the prudence or folly
of the legislature's fiscal acumen.
It makes little sense to construe Sec. 13, Article VII to require
the board to review expenditures made by the legislature for its own purposes
in advance, or at all, for that matter, if as held in Budge, supra, the
legislature is endowed with the final authority to accept or reject claims
against the state.

Such a construction of Sec. 13, imposes a needlessly time

consuming and futileresponsibility upon the board since it is unlikely the
legislature will seriously question or reject a claim incurred on its own
account.
The strictly mechanical interpretation of Article VII, Sec. 13, urged
upon the court by defendants fails to recognize t^e fundamental purpose
which underlies the "examination of claims by the board" proviso; namely,
to act, as pointed out in Bateman, supra, as a fact finder and advisor
to a part-time legislature concerning claims against the state.

Such a

purpose, needless to say, is without value when the claims to be scrutinized
are incurred by the legislature which is in a more enlightened position than
the board to determine and weigh the advantages, disadvantages, and
advisability of its own expenditures.
POINT IV
RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ATTEST THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF
GOVERNMENT.
Several constitutional amendments of recent origin attest the
independence and complete autonomy of the legislative department from any
fiscal or other surveillance by the executive department.

Article VI,

Sec. 31, approved by the voters November 7, 1972, provides:
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"For attendance at meetings of interim committees
established by law to function between legislative
sessions, members of the Legislature shall
receive additional per diem compensation and
mileage at a rate not to exceed that provided in this
Constitution for regular legislative sessions."
Sec. 32 of the Article adopted on the same date provides:
"The Legislature may appoint temporary or permanent
nonmember employees for work during and between
sessions, including independent legal counsel which
shall provide and control all legal services for the
Legislature except as the Legislature by law shall
authorize performance thereof by the attorney general,"
Sec. 33 of Article VI also approved November 7, 1972, provides:
"The Legislature shall appoint a legislative auditor to
serve at its pleasure. The legislative auditor shall have
authority to conduct audits of any funds, functions, and accounts
in any branch, department, agency or political subdivision
of this state and shall perform such other related duties
as may be prescribed by the Legislature. He shall report
to and be answerable only to the Legislature."
These amendments contemplate autonomy in the legislature.

It is

given the power to attend interim committee meetings, yet the power claimed
by the board in this action would give it the power to indirectly discourage
attendance at such meetings through refusal to pay vouchers tendered for
the payment of mileage.

The legislature is given the power to appoint

nonmember employees for work during and between sessions, yet the power claimed
by the board would give it control over legislative hiring practices and
the salaries paid.

Finally, the legislature is given the power to appoint

a legislative auditor to serve at its pleasure with authority to conduct
audits and perform such other related duties as the legislature prescribes,
yet the power claimed by the board would subject the appointment to executive
scrutiny.

Such vast power in the board clearly is not contemplated by

Sec. 13, Article VII.
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CONCLUSION
When the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative
enactments is indulged; when the long adherence t^> the exception provided
in section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, both before and after
Toronto, supra, is considered; when the importance of the tripartite
system of government with its attendant separation of powers is
reviewed; when the rationale underlying the exception for salaries and
compensation in Article VII, Sec. 13, is explored; when the principal
purpose of the board in examining claims is assessed; and when the recent
amendments to the Constitution are comtemplated; plaintiffs respectfully
submit that the validity of the legislative exception contained in section
63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, becomes patent and that it is not
contrary to the state Constitution*
Respectfully submitted,
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL

MELVIN E. LESLjE
Genial Counsel

CHAM
nt General Counsel

GARY E. ATKIN
Staff Counsel
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